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Abstract— Providing security guarantee is a critical concern
in the ad-hoc networks relying on multi-hop channels, since
their flexible topology is vulnerable to security attacks. To
enhance the security of a spatial modulation (SM) assisted
wireless network, various SM mapping patterns are activated
by random channel quality indicator (CQI) patterns over the
legitimate link, as a physical-layer secret key. The SM sig-
nals are encrypted by random mapping patterns to prevent
eavesdroppers from correctly demapping their detections. This
secret key is developed for multi-hop wiretap ad-hoc networks,
where eavesdroppers might monitor all the transmitting nodes
of a legitimate link. We substantially characterise the multi-
hop wiretap model with receiver diversity techniques adopted
by eavesdroppers. The security performance of the conceived
scheme is evaluated in the scenarios where eavesdroppers attempt
to detect their received signals using maximal-ratio combining
or maximum-gain selection. The achievable data rates of both
legitimate and wiretapper links are formulated with the objective
of quantifying the secrecy rates for both Gaussian-distributed and
finite-alphabet inputs. Illustrative numerical results are provided
for the metrics of ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage
probability, which substantiate the compelling benefits of the
physical-layer secret key generation via CQI-mapped SM.
Index Terms— Ad-hoc networks, channel quality indicator
(CQI), multi-hop, multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) wire-
tap channel, physical layer security (PLS), secrecy rate, spatial
modulation (SM).
I. INTRODUCTION
In contrast to traditional network security techniques that
reckon on higher-layer encryption, physical layer security
(PLS) exploits the inherent randomness of wireless channels
for secret key generation to prevent any eavesdropper (Eve)
from extracting confidential information by wiretapping [1]–
[3]. Therefore, PLS is particularly suitable for the low-
complexity devices and the dynamically fluctuating topology
of ad-hoc networks, such as the Internet-of-things (IoT), where
higher-layer encryption cannot be readily implemented without
the infrastructure [4]–[6].
Early PLS studies are initiated from an information-
theoretic perspective [7]–[9], where wiretapper links are
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deemed to be degraded versions of legitimate links. To turn
non-degraded wiretapper links into degraded ones, PLS can be
realised by inflicting extra interference upon Eve, specifically
through security-oriented beamforming or precoding [10]–
[12], jamming [13]–[15], and artificial noise [16]–[18]. More-
over, cooperative signal processing and relay selection proto-
cols are advanced for PLS improvement [19], [20]. Then, the
information-theoretic secret key is exchanged over a legitimate
link based on the physical-layer attribute differences between
the degraded wiretapper link and the legitimate link [21], [22].
These PLS techniques exploit the random characteristics of
wireless channels in conjunction with multi-antenna configura-
tions, typically stipulating the idealised assumption that Eve’s
channel state information (CSI) or its statistics is available at
the legitimate transmitter.
An attractive multi-antenna solution is spatial modulation
(SM) [23]–[26], which has been exploited for enhancing
the PLS through a random data-driven selection of transmit
antennas (TAs) governed by the information bits mapped onto
the TAs and the legitimate user’s CSI. In particular, precoding
or artificial-noise aided SM is developed to minimize Eve’s
received power while maximising the legitimate receiver’s
power [27]. Jamming or beamforming aided SM is developed
for transmitting the interference to Eve in the null-space of the
legitimate receiver [28], [29]. Furthermore, relay selection is
developed for SM in dual-hop cooperative networks to achieve
PLS [30].
Against this backdrop, we aim to exploit the random
characteristics of information sources rather than those of
channel states to generate a physical-layer secret key and boost
the security. More specifically, the secret key is generated
by varying the SM mapping patterns, i.e., the bit-to-symbol
mapping and the TA selection. In [31], an adaptive bit-to-
symbol mapper was designed for SM to optimise the bit
error rate (BER), with an extremely high complexity in the
computation and comparison of the BERs pertaining to all
possible mapping patterns. To reduce the complexity, near-
optimal solutions can be identified at the receiver and their
index may be signalled back to the transmitter through a
feedback channel [32]. Unfortunately, this feedback provides
Eve with more opportunities to monitor the SM mapping
patterns adopted in the legitimate link. As a design alternative,
Euclidean-distance based TA selection was designed for SM
in [33], [34] but, again, the exhaustive search over all possible
TA selection patterns leads to an excessive complexity. Any-
how, the adaptive bit-to-symbol mapping and the optimised TA
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TABLE I
CONTRASTING THE NOVELTY OF OUR WORK TO THE LITERATURE.
Contributions Ours [5]
[7], [8], [12] [9]–[11], [13]
[27]–[29] [30]
[31]
[33] [34] [35] [36] [37]
[14]–[18], [22] [19]–[21] [32]
Physical Layer Security X X X X X X X X X X
Spatial Modulation X X X X X X X
Bit-to-Symbol Mapping X X X
TA Selection X X X X X
Relaying X X X X
Multi-Hop X X
MRC at Eve X X X
MGS at Eve X
selection unveil the possibility to address a moderate level of
PLS. To degrade Eve’s decoding performance for the purpose
of enhancing the PLS, a physical-layer secret key was also
generated by activating various SM mapping patterns on the
basis of the legitimate channel quality indicator (CQI) [35].
The complexity of this secret key generation is relatively low,
because (i) the CSI of the links spanning from legitimate
transmitters to Eve is not involved at all, (ii) the CQI over a
legitimate link is known at the transmitter and desired receiver
readily and synchronously in the time division duplex (TDD)
mode, and (iii) the active SM mapping pattern is selected in
a straightforward way, without complicated computation.
Compared to conventional wireless networks, it is more
challenging for ad-hoc and IoT networks to achieve the
requirements on high flexibility and low complexity in the
PLS implementation. Motivated by this, we further develop
the physical-layer secret key generation via CQI-mapped SM
for multi-hop wiretap ad-hoc networks and quantify its per-
formance. Since a SM signal is forwarded several times over
a multi-hop wiretap channel, Eve has multiple opportunities
to detect the information. Given the availability of multiple
copies of the SM signal received from the legitimate link,
receiver diversity techniques can be exploited by Eve for en-
hancing her detection performance via maximal-ratio combin-
ing (MRC) or maximum-gain selection (MGS). The average
secrecy capacity and/or the secrecy outage probability of a
point-to-point link have been evaluated for the scenarios where
Eve adopts multi-antenna MRC [36] and TA selection [37] to
enhance the chance of her successful detection. Concerning the
vulnerability of multi-hop ad-hoc networks, in this paper we
investigate the scenarios where Eve distributes multi-antenna
frontends to monitor all legitimate nodes’ transmissions. In
particular, Eve adopts multi-hop MRC or multi-hop MGS to
process the multiple signal copies she has received from the
legitimate link. In these scenarios, we formulate the achievable
data rates of both the legitimate link and the wiretapper link as
well as the secrecy rates of multi-hop wiretap ad-hoc networks,
under the assumptions of both Gaussian-distributed inputs and
realistic finite-alphabet inputs in the SM mapping for the
physical-layer secret key generation.
The novel contributions of this work are contrasted to the
literate of PLS and/or SM in Table I. Specifically, our main
contributions are three-fold:
• To improve the security of ad-hoc and IoT networks, the
CQI-mapped SM is exploited for the physical-layer secret
key generation in the context of multi-hop multiple-input-
multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels, where none of
the legitimate nodes knows the CSI of the links spanning
from themselves to Eve.
• We completely characterise the multi-hop wiretap ad-
hoc networks where Eve benefits from distributed multi-
antenna frontends to collect multiple copies of the SM
signal forwarded over the legitimate link and employs
multi-hop MRC and multi-hop MGS for boosting her
detection capability.
• The mathematical framework of both the secrecy rates
and their outage probabilities achieved by multi-hop wire-
tap ad-hoc networks relying on the proposed physical-
layer secret key is established in the characterised sce-
narios with both Gaussian-distributed and finite-alphabet
inputs.
To detail the aforementioned contributions, the remainder
of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly, the developed
physical-layer secret key for a multi-hop MIMO wiretap
ad-hoc network and its BER performance are presented in
Section II. Subsequently, the achievable data rates of both the
legitimate link and the wiretapper link are analysed in Sec-
tions III and IV, respectively, where both Gaussian-distributed
and finite-alphabet inputs are investigated, when Eve relies
on MRC or MGS. Based on this mathematical framework,
Section V analyses the secrecy rates of the considered multi-
hop wiretap ad-hoc networks and provides numerical results.
Finally, we conclude in Section VI.
Notations: Matrices and vectors are denoted by boldface
uppercase and lowercase letters, respectively. In particular,
0M×1 denotes the M × 1 zero vector and IM is the M ×M
identity matrix. The conjugate, the transpose, the conjugate
transpose and the modulus operators are represented by (·)∗,
(·)T, (·)† and | · |, respectively. Moreover, d2 (u, v) denotes
the squared Euclidean distance between signals u and v, and
max(0, x) is the maximum value between 0 and x. The
factorial of a positive integer M is denoted by M !, i.e.,
M ! = M×(M−1)×· · ·×2×1. In addition, E {·} represents
the expectation (mean) operator and Pr{·} stands for the
probability of an event. The probability density function (PDF)
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Fig. 1. The model of a multi-hop MIMO wiretap ad-hoc network, where
Eve distributes multi-antenna frontends to collect multiple copies of the signal
forwarded over the legitimate link.
of a random variable x is denoted by p(x), and the conditional
PDF of x given the event of y = A is denoted by p(x|y = A).
II. NETWORK MODEL AND SECRET KEY GENERATION
In this section, the physical-layer secret key generation via
CQI-mapped SM is developed for multi-hop MIMO wiretap
ad-hoc networks.
A. Network Model
The network model is shown in Fig. 1, where the legitimate
link is composed of L+ 1 nodes, and hence we have L hops.
The communication between the source, denoted by Node 0,
and the destination, i.e., Node L, needs L − 1 intermediate
nodes’ assistance. The number of antennas at Node l is Ml,
where l = 0, 1, · · · , L. Due to the constraints on radio module
and battery life of ad-hoc and IoT devices, the legitimate nodes
have to transmit their signals at a low power, which guarantees
ignorable interference received at undesired nodes over the
legitimate link as well as negligible amount of information
leaked to eavesdroppers. Thus, the number of hops in the
legitimate link is determined by the distance from the source
to the destination and the transmit power of each intermediate
node.
To improve the resource utilisation efficiency, the TDD
mode is exploited in each hop, which allows multiple nodes in
an ad-hoc network to access a shared spectral band and hence
no wasteful guard bands are needed. Moreover, the channel
reciprocity of the TDD mode allows a pair of communicating
nodes to exploit each other’s CSI without using a feedback
channel. More specifically, the CSI of the link spanning from
Node l−1 to Node l is the same as that from Node l to Node
l−1 and vice versa. Therefore, Node l−1 can exploit the CSI
of the link spanning from itself to Node l by using Node l’s
pilot symbols to estimate the CSI of the link spanning from
Node l to itself.
Consider the confidential information delivered from Node
0 to Node L, via L − 1 intermediate nodes’ forwarding. In
the multi-hop ad-hoc network under study, Eve is assumed to
have a sophisticated receiver, which allows us to investigate
the maximum possible information leakage. More explicitly, to
maximise Eve’s wiretapping capability in the interest of quan-
tifying the maximum possible information leakage, we assume
that she has L frontends, each relying on NE antennas, for
monitoring all legitimate nodes’ transmissions in their vicinity.
In other words, Eve is able to collect the signals transmitted
by all the L hops and exploits all these signals to unveil
the confidential information conveyed over the legitimate
link. We note that this wiretapper link model is utilised for
theoretically quantifying the maximum information leakage,
which is equivalent to Eve’s achievable data rate through the
most powerful wiretapping. In practice, an eavesdropper might
not be readily capable of obtaining the signals from all the
hops over the legitimate link, especially not when the number
of hops is very large. Hence in a nutshell, we quantify the
multi-hop ad-hoc network security guaranteed by our proposed
design in the absolute worst-case scenario of Eve having the
most powerful wiretapping capability.
In the legitimate link, the channel of the lth hop, spanning
from Node l−1 to Node l, is characterised by the Ml×Ml−1
matrix Hl = [h
(l)
nm]Ml×Ml−1 = [h
(l)
1 ,h
(l)
2 , · · · ,h
(l)
Ml−1
], where
the Ml × 1 vector h(l)m = [h(l)1m, h
(l)
2m, · · · , h
(l)
Ml,m
]T contains
the channel coefficients from the mth antenna of Node l − 1
to all the antennas of Node l, for l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L}, m =
1, 2, · · · ,Ml−1, n = 1, 2, · · · ,Ml.
As for the wiretapper link, the channels spanning from Node
l − 1 to Eve’s frontend that monitors this node are repre-
sented by the NE ×Ml−1 matrices Gl = [g(l)nm]NE×Ml−1 =
[g
(l)
1 ,g
(l)
2 , · · · ,g
(l)
Ml−1
], where l = 1, 2, · · · , L, m =
1, 2, · · · ,Ml−1, n = 1, 2, · · · , NE, and the NE × 1 vector
g
(l)
m = [g
(l)
1m, g
(l)
2m, · · · , g
(l)
NE,m
]T contains the channel coeffi-
cients from the mth antenna of Node l− 1 to all the antennas
of the frontend monitoring Node l − 1.
Herein, the legitimate and wiretapper links are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) flat-fading over the same
spectrum band, and all the channels’ coefficients are assumed
to obey i.i.d. complex Gaussian distributions, i.e., h(l)nm, g
(l)
nm ∼
CN (0, 1), ∀ l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L}, m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,Ml−1}, n ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,Ml, NE}.
B. Secret Key Generation
Since the CSI is not transmitted in the TDD mode for the
handshaking between the communicating nodes, eavesdrop-
pers cannot access the legitimate CSI through wiretapping.
As such, the generation of physical-layer secret key in this
work relies on the instantaneous CQI pattern in each hop.
In the majority of previous contributions, the CSI knowl-
edge is directly exploited for enhancing the level of PLS by
beamforming, precoding, jamming or artificial noise; see [10]–
[22], [27]–[30] and the references therein. The objective of
these PLS techniques is to degrade wiretapper links, while
improving the legitimate link quality. An important assumption
in these schemes is that the transmitter knows the wiretapper
link’s CSI or at least its statistics, which are then exploited
for beamforming, precoding, jamming or artificial noise gen-
eration. However, this assumption is impractical, especially
when the eavesdroppers are non-authorised subscribers. Fur-
thermore, the eavesdroppers typically do not transmit. Hence,
estimating their CSI is rather unfeasible and only best-case
results can be attained. To dispense this idealized simplifying
assumption, we use the SM mapping pattern as a secret key,
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Fig. 2. The physical-layer secret key generation via CQI-mapped SM for
the lth hop in the channel Hl over the legitimate link.
which is governed by the random instantaneous CQI of the
legitimate link.
In the lth hop’s channel Hl, the CQI of TA m at Node l−1
to all the antennas at Node l is denoted by γ(l)m = (h
(l)
m )
†
(h
(l)
m ),
where l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L} and m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,Ml−1}; thus, the
CQI pattern in this hop is the permutation containing all γ(l)m
in descending or ascending order.
For example, if Node l − 1 has Ml = 2 TAs, there are
two CQI patterns in the lth hop, i.e., Pattern 1 is γ(l)1 > γ
(l)
2
and Pattern 2 is γ(l)2 > γ
(l)
1 . When Ml = 4, there are 24
permutations of the 4 CQIs, γ(l)1 , γ
(l)
2 , γ
(l)
3 , γ
(l)
4 , in the l
th
hop, i.e., γ(l)1 > γ
(l)
2 > γ
(l)
3 > γ
(l)
4 , γ
(l)
4 > γ
(l)
3 > γ
(l)
2 > γ
(l)
1 ,
and so on. From an ergodic view point, the total number of
CQI patterns in the lth hop is Pl−1 = Ml−1! and these patterns
occur at the same probability.
The physical-layer secret key generation via CQI-mapped
SM in the lth hop of the legitimate link is presented in
Fig. 2, where the transmitter Node l − 1 formats its SM
mapping patterns based on the instantaneous CQI pattern of
this hop’s channel Hl, as a secret key to enhance the PLS,
l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L}.
The initial source information at Node 0 is denoted by x0 =
[x
(0)
a ,x
(0)
d ] and the decode-and-forward protocol is applied
in the legitimate link. Without loss of generality, the source
information bit stream in the lth hop is expressed as xl−1 =
[x
(l−1)
a ,x
(l−1)
d ], where the vectors x
(l−1)
a and x
(l−1)
d contain
the TA information bits and the classic amplitude/phase-shift
keying (APSK) information bits, respectively, to be conveyed
by Node l − 1. The number of APSK-mapping patterns at
Node l − 1 is Ql−1 = Kl−1!, where Kl−1 is the number of
APSK constellation points adopted by Node l− 1. Moreover,
since Node l− 1 has Ml−1 antennas, the number of TA-index
patterns is equal to the number of CQI patterns in the channel
Hl, Pl−1 = Ml−1!.
More specifically, the varied SM mapping patterns are
deemed to be the physical-layer secret keys in each hop of
the legitimate link. That is, the APSK-mapping patterns and
TA-index patterns are varied according to instantaneous CQI
patterns over the legitimate link.
In an arbitrary transmission, if the pl−1th CQI pattern
occurs in the lth hop channel Hl, Node l − 1 will ex-
ploit the pl−1th TA-index pattern, denoted by Tpl−1(·),
pl−1 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Pl−1}, and the ql−1th APSK-mapping
pattern pertaining to the CQI pattern of this signalling interval
also termed as channel-use, denoted by Mql−1(·), ql−1 ∈
𝑎 𝛾1
(𝑙)
> 𝛾2
(𝑙)
𝑏 𝛾2
(𝑙)
> 𝛾1
(𝑙)
1000
1101
TA 1
TA 2
−1 +1
−1 +1
0111
0010
TA 1
TA 2
−1 +1
−1 +1
𝔐1 ∙
𝔗1 ∙
𝔐2 ∙
𝔗2 ∙
𝔐1 ∙
𝔐2 ∙
Fig. 3. The physical-layer secret key generation via CQI-mapped SM with
BPSK and 2 TAs in the lth hop.
{1, 2, · · · , Ql−1}. In this hop, the received baseband signals
at Node l and Eve are formulated as
yD,l = h
(l)
Tpl−1 (x
(l−1)
a )
Mql−1(x
(l−1)
d ) + zD,l (1)
and
yE,l = g
(l)
Tpl−1 (x
(l−1)
a )
Mql−1(x
(l−1)
d ) + zE,l, (2)
respectively, where the Ml × 1 vectors yD,l and zD,l ∼
CN
(
0Ml×1, σ
2
W IMl
)
contain Node l’s received signals and
the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) components, re-
spectively. Meanwhile, the NE × 1 vectors yE,l and zE,l ∼
CN
(
0NE×1, σ
2
W INE
)
contain Eve’s received signals and
AWGN components, respectively, during the lth hop in the
legitimate link. Moreover, the subscript Tpl−1(x
(l−1)
a ) denotes
the TA index activated by x(l−1)a according to the pl−1th TA-
index pattern at Node l − 1. Therefore, the Ml × 1 vector
h
(l)
Tpl−1 (x
(l−1)
a )
and the NE × 1 vector g(l)
Tpl−1 (x
(l−1)
a )
contain
the channels’ coefficients spanning from the activated TA at
Node l − 1 to Node l and Eve’s frontend that monitors Node
l − 1, respectively. In addition, Mql−1(x
(l−1)
d ) is the APSK
input transmitted by Node l − 1, which is mapped by x(l−1)d
according to the ql−1th APSK-mapping pattern.
For instance, if Node l− 1 has 2 TAs for conveying the TA
information x(l−1)a and adopts BPSK modulation for transmit-
ting the APSK information x(l−1)d , there will be Pl−1 = 2
TA-index patterns and Ql−1 = 2 APSK-mapping patterns.
The physical-layer secret key generation in this case, i.e., the
variation of SM mapping patterns based on the instantaneous
CQI pattern, is illustrated in Fig. 3. When the first CQI pattern
(γ(l)1 > γ
(l)
2 ) occurs, the SM mapping patterns are given by
Fig. 3 (a), where the first TA-index pattern T1(·) and the
first APSK-mapping pattern M1(·) are activated. In detail,
T1(0) = 1, T1(1) = 2, and M1(0) = −1, M1(1) = +1.
When the second CQI pattern (γ(l)2 > γ
(l)
1 ) occurs, the SM
mapping patterns are given by Fig. 3 (b), where the second
TA-index pattern T2(·) and the second APSK-mapping pattern
M2(·) are activated. That is, T2(1) = 1, T2(0) = 2, and
M2(1) = −1, M2(0) = +1. Since Eve is unable to access
the CQI patterns of the legitimate link, she has no knowledge
on the SM mapping patterns and, hence, does not have correct
basis to demap the confidential information conveyed over the
legitimate link.
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III. SIGNAL DETECTION
In this section, the signal detection methods in the legitimate
link and the wiretapper link are detailed, based on which the
simulation results of their BER performance are reported.
A. Detection in the Legitimate Link
Thanks to the channel reciprocity in TDD mode, Node l
always knows the instantaneous CQI pattern in the channel
Hl through CSI estimation. Accordingly, the APSK-mapping
pattern Mql−1(·) and the TA-index pattern Tpl−1(·) exploited
by Node l − 1 are also known to Node l.
Upon receiving the signals yD,l, Node l may detect the
APSK information x(l−1)d and the TA information x
(l−1)
a
according to the following twin-step maximum-likelihood al-
gorithm [24]: Firstly, the candidate decisions are made in terms
of
Mql−1(x̂
(l−1)
d,m ) = arg min
s∈Mql−1 (·)
d2
(
s,
(h
(l)
m )†yD,l
(h
(l)
m )
†
(h
(l)
m )
)
,
m = 1, 2, · · · ,Ml−1;
(3)
and then, Node l will choose x̂(l−1)d = x̂
(l−1)
d,Tpl−1 (x̂
(l−1)
a )
while
getting x̂(l−1)a if and only if
Tpl−1(x̂
(l−1)
a )
= arg min
m∈{1,2,··· ,Ml−1}
d2
(
Mql−1(x̂
(l−1)
d,m ),
(h
(l)
m )†yD,l
(h
(l)
m )
†
(h
(l)
m )
)
.
(4)
After detecting the information transmitted from Node l−1
in the lth hop, Node l will forward its detected information,
x̂
(l−1)
d and x̂
(l−1)
a , to Node l+1 in the l + 1th hop. Hence, the
APSK information and the TA information to be transmitted
from Node l are x(l)d = x̂
(l−1)
d and x
(l)
a = x̂
(l−1)
a , respectively.
As such, the physical-layer secret key generation via CQI-
mapped SM is activated for each hop of the legitimate link,
and the Lth hop is the last one, where the destination Node L
gets the source information x̂(L−1)d and x̂
(L−1)
a by detecting
the signals transmitted from Node L− 1.
B. Detection in the Wiretapper Link
Eve will attempt to detect the source information x0 based
on her own received signals, yE,l, l = 1, 2, · · · , L, by wiretap-
ping all hops of the legitimate link. However, since Eve does
not know the CQI pattern in any hop of the legitimate link, she
has no information on the physical-layer secret key, i.e., the
SM mapping patterns Mql−1(·) and Tpl−1(·), generated in the
legitimate hops, l = 1, 2, · · · , L. Therefore, Eve will reckon
on her anticipated APSK-mapping pattern ME,l−1(·) and TA-
index pattern TE,l−1(·) to demap the source information in
the lth hop.
Since Eve has collected L versions of the source information
from the L hops, she will attain diversity gains using the
following two methods.
1) Maximal-Ratio Combining (MRC): Eve’s decision on
the source information x̂0 is made using the maximum-
likelihood algorithm of
x̂0 = arg min
s0
L∑
l=1
d2
(
yE,l, g
(l)
TE,l−1(s
(l−1)
a )
ME,l−1(s
(l−1)
d )
)
,
(5)
where the bit stream s0 is divided into two streams s
(l−1)
a and
s
(l−1)
d with respect to the l
th hop in the legitimate link. The
lengths of s(l−1)a and s
(l−1)
d are determined by the number
of TAs at Node l − 1, Ml−1, and the number of APSK
constellation points adopted by Node l−1, Kl−1, respectively.
2) Maximum-Gain Selection (MGS): Eve will process the
signals received through the maximum-gain wiretapping chan-
nel Gl∗ to make her final decision on the source information
x̂0 = [x̂
(0)
a , x̂
(0)
d ], where we have
l∗ = arg max
l∈{1,2,··· ,L}
1
Ml−1
Ml−1∑
m=1
(g(l)m )
†
(g(l)m ). (6)
In detail, Eve’s candidate decisions on the APSK input
transmitted by Node l∗ − 1 are made in terms of
ME,l∗−1(x̂
(0)
d,m) = arg min
s∈ME,l∗−1(·)
d2
(
s,
(g
(l∗)
m )†yE,l∗
(g
(l∗)
m )
†
(g
(l∗)
m )
)
,
m = 1, 2, · · · ,Ml∗−1;
(7)
and subsequently, Eve will choose x̂(0)d = x̂
(0)
d,TE,l∗−1(x̂
(0)
a )
,
while making a decision concerning the activated TA index in
terms of
TE,l∗−1(x̂
(0)
a )
= arg min
m∈{1,2,··· ,Ml∗−1}
d2
(
ME,l∗−1(x̂
(0)
d,m),
(g
(l∗)
m )†yE,l∗
(g
(l∗)
m )†(g
(l∗)
m )
)
.
(8)
Although both these receive-diversity techniques may help
Eve to improve her detection performance of the SM signals
forwarded over the legitimate link, she still cannot obtain the
correct APSK information x(0)d and/or TA information x
(0)
a ,
because she is unaware of the SM mapping patterns utilised.
Even if Eve could use a brute-force approach to search all
possible SM mapping patterns, she has no basis to pick up the
correct one. Hence, the secrecy of the confidential messages
conveyed over the legitimate link will be guaranteed by the
physical-layer secret key.
C. Bit Error Rate
Herein, the BER performance of multi-hop ad-hoc networks
with the proposed secret key generation via CQI-mapped SM
is investigated in the following two scenarios.
1) Perfect CSI/CQI at the Transmitter and Receiver in Each
Hop: For this scenario, the BER comparisons between single-
hop (L = 1) and multi-hop (L = 2, 4, 8) wiretap ad-hoc
networks with our proposed secret key generation design are
reported in Fig. 4, where the number of antennas set at each
legitimate node, Ml = 2 and 4. Eve’s BER is also presented,
with NE = 2 and 4 antennas at each wiretapping frontend.
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Fig. 4. BER of L = 1, 2, 4, 8-hop ad-hoc networks using the secret key
generation via CQI-mapped SM in the scenario of perfect CSI known with
Ml = 2, 4. Eve’s BER with perfect CSI, NE = 2, 4, is also shown for
comparison.
This figure reveals that the BER performance of the legitimate
link gets worse with the increase in the number of hops and
gets better with the increase in the number of antennas set at
each node.
A further observation in this figure is that, with the proposed
design, Eve cannot obtain any information forwarded over
the legitimate link, regardless of how many antennas at each
wiretapping frontend using whether MRC or MGS, if our
secret key generation is adopted by legitimate nodes. The
main reason behind this is that the legitimate CQI pattern is
unavailable to Eve and, thus, Eve has no basis of choosing
correct SM mapping patterns to demap her detection.
In addition, the BER performance of the destination and Eve
in [30] is provided in Fig. 4(a) for the sake of comparison,
where jamming with relay selection is exploited to implement
the PLS in a dual-hop (L = 2) network with precoded SM.
In this network, the source has M0 = 4 TAs, each relay has
2 antennas, the destination has 4 antennas, and Eve has 4
antennas as well. It is assumed that Eve’s CSI is perfectly
known by the legitimate link for the jamming. Moreover,
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Fig. 5. BER of L = 1, 2, 4, 8-hop ad-hoc networks using the secret key
generation via CQI-mapped SM in the scenario of practical channel estimation
with 5 and 10 pilot symbols, Ml = 2. Eve’s BER with perfect CSI, NE = 2,
is also shown for comparison.
the transmit power is divided into two parts, i.e., δl for
the SM precoding and (1 − δl) for the jamming, l = 1, 2.
The power allocation for SM precoding is δ1 = 0.5 in the
first hop, and δ = 0.3, 0.7 in the second hop. As is shown
in this figure, both the destination and Eve achieve better
performance when more power is used for the SM precoding,
namely less power for the jamming. Compared to this scheme,
our proposed design has two main merits: higher energy
efficiency and lower information leakage. Firstly, we do not
need extra transmit power to jam Eve; thereby, all the transmit
power contributes to the legitimate SM transmission. Secondly,
Eve’s BER performance is always around 0.5 in our scheme,
regardless of how she detects her received signals, since she
cannot correctly demap the confidential information.
2) Practical Channel Estimation at the Transmitter and Re-
ceiver in Each Hop: The BER performance of L = 1, 2, 4, 8-
hop ad-hoc networks with our proposed physical-layer secret
key generation in this scenario is presented in Fig. 5, where the
CSI estimations using 5 pilot symbols and 10 pilot symbols
are investigated for the case of Ml = 2 antennas set at each
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Fig. 6. The impact of channel estimation imprecision on the accuracy of
CQI pattern recognition.
legitimate node. Moreover, Eve’s BER is also provided, with
NE = 2 antennas at each wiretapping frontend. As is shown
in this figure, better channel estimation, i.e., using more pilot
symbols, leads to better BER performance of the legitimate
link. Comparing the case of Ml = 2 antennas in Figs. 4 and 5,
we may find that the BER difference between the scenarios
of perfect CSI and channel estimation using 10 pilot symbols
is negligible, specifically in the region of high signal-to-noise
power ratio (SNR).
From the perspective of channel estimation, the channel
estimation error is equivalent to the induction of extra noise
and the perfect CSI can be achieved by using more pilot sym-
bols or increasing transmit power in the channel estimation.
Furthermore, the CQI in the lth hop, γ(l)m = (h
(l)
m )
†
(h
(l)
m ), is
a random variable with mean Ml and variance 5.5Ml. Given
that the variance increases linearly with the number of receive
antennas, Ml, each CQI value is expected to become more
equi-probable upon increasing the number of receive antennas
in the lth hop. Hence, the system is more likely to correctly
recognize the active CQI pattern for a high number of receive
antennas, which improves the PLS. By contrast, the channel
estimation accuracy has a lower impact on the PLS.
For example, the impact of channel estimation imprecision
on the accuracy of CQI pattern recognition is shown in Fig. 6,
for the lth hop with Ml−1 = 4 TAs, where the CQI pattern
of the moment is γ(l)3 > γ
(l)
4 > γ
(l)
1 > γ
(l)
2 . The impact of
the channel estimation imprecision due to noise is denoted
by the green circle, whose radius is reduced through using
more pilot symbols or increasing transmit power in the channel
estimation. On the other hand, setting more receive antennas
enlarges the distance between CQIs at higher probability.
Therefore, the imprecision of channel estimation will have no
influence on the accuracy of CQI pattern recognition and the
legitimate link performance, if sufficient pilot symbols and
receive antennas are utilised in each hop.
As such, we will study the multi-hop ad-hoc network
security rate achieved by our proposed design in the scenario
of perfect CSI known by both the legitimate link and the
wiretapper link.
IV. ACHIEVABLE DATA RATE OF THE LEGITIMATE LINK
To evaluate the security performance of the proposed secret
key generation in multi-hop wiretap ad-hoc networks, from an
information-theoretic perspective, the achievable data rate of
the legitimate link is firstly formulated in this section. Then,
the secrecy rate will be obtained by comparing the achievable
data rate of the legitimate link and Eve’s achievable data rate
that is formulated in next section.
A. Gaussian-Distributed Input
The achievable data rates of Gaussian-distributed inputs
represent the upper bounds of realistic finite-alphabet inputs.
Explicitly, the signals transmitted from all nodes over the
legitimate link are restricted to be the random variables chosen
from complex Gaussian distributed codebooks CN (0, σ2X) at
the transmit power of σ2X . Hence, in this subsection we refer
to Gaussian information instead of APSK information.
In the multi-hop MIMO wiretap ad-hoc network using our
proposed secret key, the instantaneous data rate of the legiti-
mate link having Gaussian-distributed inputs can be expressed
as
CD = min
(
C
(1)
D , C
(2)
D , · · · , C
(L)
D
)
, (9)
where C(l)D is the instantaneous data rate in the l
th hop, l =
1, 2, · · · , L, obtained by
C
(l)
D = C
(l)
Da + C
(l)
Dd, (10)
with C(l)Da and C
(l)
Dd denoting the achievable data rates pertain-
ing to SM transmissions of the TA information x(l−1)a and the
Gaussian information x(l−1)d , respectively, from Node l− 1 to
Node l.
In detail, the term C(l)Da in (10) is calculated using
C
(l)
Da =
1
Ml−1
Ml−1∑
m=1
∫
ȳD,l
p
(
ȳD,l|x(l−1)a
)
× log2
p
(
ȳD,l|x(l−1)a
)
p(ȳD,l)
dȳD,l,
(11)
where ȳD,l = (h
(l)
m )†yD,l is the signal detected by Node l, as
shown in (3) and (4). As the input Mql−1(x
(l−1)
d ) is complex
Gaussian distributed, the conditional PDF of ȳD,l given the
TA information x(l−1)a is formulated as
p
(
ȳD,l|x(l−1)a
)
=
1
πσ2ȳD,l
exp
(
−|ȳD,l|
2
σ2ȳD,l
)
, (12)
where σ2ȳD,l = [(h
(l)
m )
†(h
(l)
m )]2σ2X + (h
(l)
m )
†(h
(l)
m )σ2W is the
variance of ȳD,l with respect to the Gaussian-distributed input
Mql−1(x
(l−1)
d ) transmitted from the m
th TA at Node l − 1.
Accordingly, the PDF of ȳD,l is obtained in the form of
p(ȳD,l) =
1
Ml−1
Ml−1∑
m=1
p
(
ȳD,l|x(l−1)a
)
. (13)
Additionally, the second item on the right-hand side of (10),
C
(l)
Dd, is given by
C
(l)
Dd =
1
Ml−1
Ml−1∑
m=1
log2
(
1 +
σ2X
σ2W
(h(l)m )
†(h(l)m )
)
. (14)
By substituting (11) and (14) into (10), the instantaneous
data rate for the transmission of confidential SM messages in
the lth hop over the legitimate link, i.e. from Node l − 1 to
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Node l, is accomplished. Subsequently, the legitimate link rate
in the case of Gaussian-distributed input given by (9) will be
obtained.
B. Finite-Alphabet Input
The transmit power of each node is denoted by σ2X and the
resultant SNR is ρ = σ2X/σ
2
W . The instantaneous data rate of
the legitimate link with finite-alphabet inputs is expressed as
RD = min
(
R
(1)
D , R
(2)
D , · · · , R
(L)
D
)
. (15)
Herein, the instantaneous data rate in the lth hop, dented
by R(l)D , l = 1, 2, · · · , L, is formulated by (16), where the
Ml × 1 vector d(l)k,k
′
m,m′ = h
(l)
m s
(l)
k − h
(l)
m′s
(l)
k′ associated with
s
(l)
k , s
(l)
k′ ∈Mql−1(·), and (m′, k′) 6= (m, k) excludes the event
when m′ = m and k′ = k occur together from the summation.
Moreover, Ez{·} represents the expectation with respect to the
AWGN received at Node l, i.e., zD,l in (1).
As shown in (16), for a given channel realization, f(ρ) is a
monotonically decreasing function of the SNR ρ and converges
to 1, when ρ tends to infinity, i.e., lim
ρ→+∞
f(ρ) = 1. Thus, as
ρ approaches infinity, we have the limit of
lim
ρ→+∞
R
(l)
D (ρ) = log2(Ml−1Kl−1), (17)
which is the upper bound on the data rate of the lth hop having
Ml−1 TAs and Kl−1 APSK constellation points adopted by
Node l − 1.
V. ACHIEVABLE DATA RATE IN THE WIRETAPPER LINK
In this section, Eve’s achievable data rates are analysed for
both Gaussian-distributed and finite-alphabet inputs in multi-
hop MIMO wiretap ad-hoc networks exploiting the CQI-
mapped SM. Since Eve may detect the source information
x0 using MRC (5) or MGS (7)–(8), we will formulate her
achievable data rates in these two scenarios.
A. Maximal-Ratio Combining (MRC)
In this scenario, Eve’s instantaneous data rate is expressed
as
CE,MRC = min
(
C
(1)
D , C
(2)
D , · · · , C
(L−1)
D , C
(L)
E
)
(18)
for Gaussian-distributed inputs, and as
RE,MRC = min
(
R
(1)
D , R
(2)
D , · · · , R
(L−1)
D , R
(L)
E
)
(19)
for finite-alphabet inputs. Herein, C(L)E and R
(L)
E denote Eve’s
achievable data rates, when using MRC to process the signals
received from all nodes, i.e., Nodes 1, 2, · · · , L − 1, for
Gaussian-distributed and finite-alphabet inputs, respectively.
Moreover, C(l)D and R
(l)
D are given by (10) and (16), respec-
tively, for l = 1, 2, · · · , L− 1.
1) Gaussian-Distributed Input: The number of Gaussian-
distributed constellation points at each node, Kl−1, l =
1, 2, · · · , L, is infinite and, consequently, the probability that
Eve can successfully demap the Gaussian-distributed input
Mql−1(x
(l−1)
d ) transmitted by Node l − 1 is 0, if the bit-to-
symbol mapping pattern is varied in each channel-use. Hence,
Eve’s achievable data rate when using MRC is given by
C
(L)
E =
1
L
L∑
l=1
1
Ml−1
C
(l)
Ea, (20)
where C(l)Ea is the data rate gleaned from the TA-index detec-
tion by Eve in the lth hop, provided that she could successfully
demap x(l−1)a . Elaborating a little further, we have
C
(l)
Ea =
1
Ml−1
Ml−1∑
m=1
∫
yE,l
p
(
yE,l|x(l−1)a
)
× log2
p
(
yE,l|x(l−1)a
)
p(yE,l)
dyE,l,
(21)
where yE,l is the signal received by Eve in the lth hop, given
in (2). Since the input Mql−1(x
(l−1)
d ) is complex Gaussian dis-
tributed, the conditional PDF of yE,l given the TA information
x
(l−1)
a is denoted by
p
(
yE,l|x(l−1)a
)
=
1
πσ2yE,l
exp
(
−|yE,l|
2
σ2yE,l
)
, (22)
where σ2yE,l = (g
(l)
m )
†(g
(l)
m )σ2X + σ
2
W is the variance of yE,l
with respect to the Gaussian-distributed input Mql−1(x
(l−1)
d )
transmitted from the mth TA of Node l− 1. Accordingly, the
PDF of yE,l is obtained by
p(yE,l) =
1
Ml−1
Ml−1∑
m=1
p
(
yE,l|x(l−1)a
)
. (23)
2) Finite-Alphabet Input: In this case, Eve’s achievable data
rate using MRC is expressed as
R
(L)
E =
1
L
L∑
l=1
(
1
Ml−1
R
(l)
Ea +
1
Kl−1
R
(l)
Ed
)
, (24)
where R(l)Ea and R
(l)
Ed denote the achievable data rates of the TA
information x(l−1)a and the APSK information x
(l−1)
d gleaned
by Eve, respectively, in the lth hop, if Eve could successfully
demap them. Concretely, R(l)Ea and R
(l)
Ed are calculated using
(25) and (26), respectively, where the NE×1 vectors q(l)m,m′ =
gmsk − gm′sk and q(l)k,k
′
m,m′ = gmsk − gm′sk′ , associated
with s(l)k , s
(l)
k′ ∈ Mql−1(·), k, k′ = 1, 2, · · · ,Kl−1, m,m′ =
1, 2, · · · ,Ml−1. Moreover, Ez{·} stands for the expectation
with respect to Eve’s received AWGN, i.e., zE,l in (2).
As shown in (25) and (26), for a given channel realization,
we have lim
ρ→+∞
R
(l)
Ea(ρ) = log2Ml−1 and limρ→+∞R
(l)
Ed(ρ) =
log2Kl−1. Consequently, as ρ tends to infinity, the limit of
Eve’s instantaneous data rate R(L)E using MRC becomes
lim
ρ→+∞
R
(L)
E (ρ) =
1
L
L∑
l=1
(
log2Ml−1
Ml−1
+
log2Kl−1
Kl−1
)
. (27)
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R
(l)
D = log2(Ml−1Kl−1)
− 1
Ml−1Kl−1
Ml−1∑
m=1
Kl−1∑
k=1
Ez
{
log2
(
1 +
Ml−1∑
m′=1
Kl−1∑
k′=1
(m′,k′)6=(m,k)
exp
(
−ρ
[(
d
(l)k,k′
m,m′ + zD,l
)†(
d
(l)k,k′
m,m′ + zD,l
)
− z†D,lzD,l
])
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(ρ)
)}
(16)
R
(l)
Ea = log2Ml−1 −
1
Ml−1Kl−1
Ml−1∑
m=1
Kl−1∑
k=1
Ez
{
log2
(Ml−1∑
m′=1
exp
(
−ρ
[(
q
(l)
m,m′ + zE,l
)†(
q
(l)
m,m′ + zE,l
)
− z†E,lzE,l
]))}
(25)
R
(l)
Ed = log2Kl−1 −
1
Ml−1Kl−1
Ml−1∑
m=1
Kl−1∑
k=1
Ez
{
log2
(Ml−1∑
m′=1
Kl−1∑
k′=1
exp
(
−ρ
(
q
(l)k,k′
m,m′ + zE,l
)†(
q
(l)k,k′
m,m′ + zE,l
)))
− log2
(Ml−1∑
m′=1
exp
(
−ρ
(
q
(l)
m,m′ + zE,l
)†(
q
(l)
m,m′ + zE,l
)))} (26)
B. Maximum-Gain Selection (MGS)
In this scenario, Eve’s instantaneous data rate is expressed
using
CE,MGS = min
(
C
(1)
D , C
(2)
D , · · · , C
(l∗−1)
D , C
(l∗)
E
)
(28)
for Gaussian-distributed inputs, and
RE,MGS = min
(
R
(1)
D , R
(2)
D , · · · , R
(l∗−1)
D , R
(l∗)
E
)
(29)
for finite-alphabet inputs, where C(l
∗)
E and R
(l∗)
E denote Eve’s
achievable data rates gleaned from the SM signals conveyed
by Node l∗ − 1, using MGS, in the cases of Gaussian-
distributed and finite-alphabet inputs, respectively. Moreover,
C
(l)
D and R
(l)
D are given by (10) and (16), respectively, for
l = 1, 2, · · · , l∗ − 1.
1) Gaussian-Distributed Input: In this case, the probability
that Eve can successfully demap the Gaussian information
transmitted by any node over the legitimate link is 0. There-
fore, Eve’s achievable data rate upon using MGS in the (l∗)th
hop is given by
C
(l∗)
E =
1
Ml∗−1
C
(l∗)
Ea , (30)
where C(l
∗)
Ea is the data rate of x
(l∗−1)
a potentially available for
Eve, provided that she could successfully demap it. In detail,
C
(l∗)
Ea is calculated using
C
(l∗)
Ea =
1
Ml∗−1
Ml∗−1∑
m=1
∫
ȳE,l∗
p
(
ȳE,l∗ |x(l
∗−1)
a
)
× log2
p
(
ȳE,l∗ |x(l
∗−1)
a
)
p(ȳE,l∗)
dȳE,l∗ ,
(31)
where ȳE,l∗ = (g
(l∗)
m )†yE,l∗ is the equivalent signal used by
Eve’s detector in the (l∗)th hop, as shown in (7) and (8). Since
the input Mql∗−1(x
(l∗−1)
d ) is complex Gaussian distributed, the
conditional PDF of ȳE,l∗ given the TA information x
(l∗−1)
a is
obtained by
p
(
ȳE,l∗ |x(l
∗−1)
a
)
=
1
πσ2ȳE,l∗
exp
(
−|ȳE,l
∗ |2
σ2ȳE,l∗
)
, (32)
where σ2ȳE,l∗ = [(g
(l∗)
m )
†(g
(l∗)
m )]2σ2X + (g
(l∗)
m )
†(g
(l∗)
m )σ2W is
the variance of ȳE,l∗ with respect to the Gaussian-distributed
input Mql∗−1(x
(l∗−1)
d ) transmitted from the m
th TA of Node
l∗ − 1. Thus, the PDF of ȳE,l∗ is
p(ȳE,l∗) =
1
Ml−1
Ml∗−1∑
m=1
p
(
ȳE,l∗ |x(l
∗−1)
a
)
. (33)
2) Finite-Alphabet Input: Since Eve is unable to flawlessly
demap the SM signals in any hop, her instantaneous data rate
upon using MGS of the (l∗)th hop is given by
R
(l∗)
E =
1
Ml∗−1
R
(l∗)
Ea +
1
Kl∗−1
R
(l∗)
Ed , (34)
where R(l
∗)
Ea and R
(l∗)
Ed denote the achievable data rates pertain-
ing to the TA information x(l
∗−1)
a and the APSK information
x
(l∗−1)
d potentially available for Eve, respectively, in the (l
∗)th
hop, provided that Eve could successfully demap them. Upon
replacing l by l∗ in (25) and (26), R(l
∗)
Ea and R
(l∗)
Ed will be
obtained.
For a given channel realization, we have lim
ρ→+∞
R
(l∗)
Ea (ρ) =
log2Ml∗−1 and lim
ρ→+∞
R
(l∗)
Ed (ρ) = log2Kl∗−1. Consequently,
as ρ tends to infinity, the limit of Eve’s instantaneous data rate
R
(l∗)
E using MGS is given by
lim
ρ→+∞
R
(l∗)
E (ρ) =
log2Ml∗−1
Ml∗−1
+
log2Kl∗−1
Kl∗−1
. (35)
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VI. SECRECY RATE OF THE SECRET KEY IN MULTI-HOP
WIRETAP AD-HOC NETWORKS
The secrecy rate of a wiretap channel is defined as the
positive difference between the achievable data rates obtained
by the legitimate link and the wiretapper link, i.e., given
that the legitimate link is of better state than the wiretapper
link. For multi-hop wiretap ad-hoc networks relying on the
proposed secret key generation, the instantaneous secrecy rate
with the Gaussian-distributed input is expressed as
Cs,MRC = max(0, CD − CE,MRC) (36)
if MRC is utilised by Eve, and
Cs,MGS = max(0, CD − CE,MGS) (37)
if Eve adopts MGS. With the finite-alphabet input, the instan-
taneous secrecy rate is denoted by
Rs,MRC = max(0, RD −RE,MRC) (38)
when Eve employs MRC, and
Rs,MGS = max(0, RD −RE,MGS) (39)
when Eve utilises MGS. Herein, CD, RD, CE,MRC, RE,MRC,
CE,MGS, and RE,MGS are given by (9), (15), (18), (19), (28),
and (29), respectively.
To evaluate the security performance of our physical-layer
secret key exploited in multi-hop ad-hoc networks, we numer-
ically evaluate the ergodic secrecy rate and the secrecy outage
probability based on the expressions in Sections IV and V, for
i.i.d. Rayleigh fading channels h(l)nm and g
(l)
nm, l = 1, 2, · · · , L,
m = 1, 2, · · · ,Ml−1, n = 1, 2, · · · ,Ml, NE.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Rate
The ergodic secrecy rates under study are defined as
E {Cs,MRC}, E {Cs,MGS}, E {Rs,MRC}, E {Rs,MGS}, where
Cs,MRC, Cs,MGS, Rs,MRC, Rs,MGS are given by (36), (37),
(38), (39), respectively.
In Fig. 7, the ergodic secrecy rates E {Cs,MRC} and
E {Cs,MGS} are compared for Gaussian-distributed inputs
within L = 2, 4, 8-hop wiretap networks, where two scenarios
are investigated: Ml = NE = 2, i.e., each node has 2
antennas, and Ml = NE = 4, l = 0, 1, · · · , L. For the
sake of comparison, the data rates E {CD} achieved over
the legitimate link with Gaussian-distributed inputs are also
plotted in this figure, where CD is given by (9). The gaps
between E {CD} and E {Cs,MRC}, E {Cs,MGS} are equivalent
to E {CE,MRC} and E {CE,MGS}, i.e., Eve’s achievable data
rates with Gaussian-distributed inputs. As shown in this figure,
the gaps between achievable data rates over the legitimate link
and the corresponding secrecy rates are negligible. Explicitly,
this implies that Eve’s attempts to detect the confidential
information forwarded over the legitimate link, using either
MRC or MGS, are nullified by our physical-layer secret key
using Gaussian-distributed inputs, within multi-hop wiretap
ad-hoc networks.
In Figs. 8 and 9, the ergodic secrecy rates E {Rs,MRC}
and E {Rs,MGS} are compared for BPSK and QPSK sources,
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Fig. 7. Ergodic secrecy rates offered by our physical-layer secret key with
Gaussian-distributed inputs, E {Cs,MRC} and E {Cs,MGS}, in L = 2, 4, 8-
hop wiretap networks for the scenarios: (i) Ml = NE = 2, and (ii)
Ml = NE = 4. Also shown is the achievable data rate of the legitimate
link, E {CD}, in these scenarios.
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Fig. 8. Ergodic secrecy rates offered by our physical-layer secret key with
BPSK input, E {Rs,MRC} and E {Rs,MGS}, in L = 2, 4, 8-hop wiretap
networks for the scenarios: (i) Ml = NE = 2, and (ii) Ml = NE = 4. Also
shown is the achievable data rate of the legitimate link, E {RD}, in these
scenarios.
respectively, within our L = 2, 4, 8-hop wiretap networks,
where the scenarios of Ml = NE = 2 and Ml = NE = 4 are
investigated, l = 0, 1, · · · , L. The data rates E {RD} attained
over the legitimate link using BPSK and QPSK are plotted
as well, where RD is given by (15). We note that the gaps
between E {RD} and E {Rs,MRC}, E {Rs,MGS} are equivalent
to E {RE,MRC} and E {RE,MGS}. Explicitly, Eve’s achievable
data rate with the finite-alphabet input converges to a constant
of log2Ml/Ml + log2Kl/Kl, as shown in Figs. 8 and 9.
Figs. 7-9 reveal that both the secrecy rates and the achiev-
able data rates of the legitimate link are reduced upon in-
creasing the number of hops. On the other hand, as the
number of transmit/receive antennas or APSK constellation
points increases, the gaps between data rates attained over
the legitimate link and their corresponding secrecy rates will
11
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Fig. 9. Ergodic secrecy rates offered by our physical-layer secret key with
QPSK input, E {Rs,MRC} and E {Rs,MGS}, in L = 2, 4, 8-hop wiretap
networks for the scenarios: (i) Ml = NE = 2, and (ii) Ml = NE = 4. Also
shown is the achievable data rate of the legitimate link, E {RD}, in these
scenarios.
be reduced. Moreover, the multi-hop wiretap ad-hoc networks
under study achieve better security performance when Eve
utilises MRC, instead of MGS. The main reason behind this
is that Eve’s achievable data rate will be determined by
the minimum one of all legitimate hops when using MRC,
while it will be determined by the minimum one of the first
l∗ − 1 legitimate hops when using MGS, as reflected by the
comparison between (18), (19) and (28), (29).
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
The secrecy outage probability is defined as the probability
that the instantaneous secrecy rate is below a target data
rate [38]. For multi-hop wiretap ad-hoc networks relying on
our physical-layer secret key, the secrecy outage probabilities
are expressed as
PGauout,MRC(ε) = Pr{Cs,MRC < (1− ε)CD} (40)
if Eve utilises MRC for detecting Gaussian-distributed inputs,
PGauout,MGS(ε) = Pr{Cs,MGS < (1− ε)CD} (41)
if Eve uses MGS for detecting Gaussian-distributed inputs,
PFinout,MRC(ε) = Pr{Rs,MRC < (1− ε)RD} (42)
if Eve employs MRC in the presence of finite-alphabet inputs,
and
PFinout,MGS(ε) = Pr{Rs,MGS < (1− ε)RD} (43)
if Eve utilises MGS for extracting the legitimate finite-alphabet
inputs. Herein, ε < 1 is a predetermined small positive
quantity and the target secrecy rates are (1 − ε)CD and
(1 − ε)RD, which are almost identical to the achievable data
rates of the legitimate link. In particular, ε → 0 implies a
near-zero rate for Eve.
In Figs. 10 and 11, secrecy outage probabilities of multi-
hop wiretap ad-hoc networks using the physical-layer secret
key with Gaussian-distributed inputs are plotted versus the
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Fig. 10. Secrecy outage probabilities of our physical-layer secret key
with Gaussian-distributed inputs and Ml = NE = 2, PGauout,MRC(0.1) and
PGauout,MGS(0.1), in L = 2, 4, 8-hop wiretap networks.
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Fig. 11. Secrecy outage probabilities of our physical-layer secret key with
Gaussian-distributed inputs and Ml = NE = 4, PGauout,MRC(0.01) and
PGauout,MGS(0.01), in L = 2, 4, 8-hop wiretap networks.
SNR σ2X/σ
2
W for the setting of Ml = NE = 2 and Ml =
NE = 4, respectively. Upon using more antennas, the security
performance becomes better, and therefore the parameter ε
may be set to a smaller number. For example, ε = 0.1 when
Ml = NE = 2 and ε = 0.01 when Ml = NE = 4. As shown
in these figures, the secrecy outage probability of the multi-
hop wiretap networks under study in the case of MRC used
by Eve is lower than that in the case of MGS. Additionally, as
the number of hops increases, the secrecy outage probability is
reduced if Eve adopts MRC, while it is increased if Eve uses
MGS. The main reason behind this phenomenon is that the
achievable data rate of the Gaussian-distributed input detected
by Eve approaches 0. Upon increasing the number of hops,
the secrecy rate of MRC adopted by Eve becomes more stable
than that of MGS used at Eve.
Furthermore, the secrecy outage probabilities of multi-hop
wiretap ad-hoc networks using our physical-layer secret key
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Fig. 12. Secrecy outage probabilities of our physical-layer secret key with
BPSK and QPSK inputs, PFinout,MRC(ε) and P
Fin
out,MGS(ε), in L = 2, 4, 8-
hop wiretap networks with Ml = NE = 2.
with BPSK and QPSK inputs are reported in Fig. 12, where the
number of antennas at each node is Ml = NE = 2. As shown
in this figure, the secrecy outage probability decreases upon
increasing the number of APSK constellation points, even if ε
gets smaller. Moreover, as the number of hops increases, the
secrecy outage probability of finite-alphabet inputs decreases
for both MRC and MGS used by Eve.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a physical-layer secret key generation via
CQI-mapped SM was developed for the multi-hop MIMO
wiretap channels of ad-hoc and IoT networks. The security
performance in this context was formulated based on the
analysis of achievable data rates over the legitimate link and in
the wiretapper link, for both Gaussian-distributed and finite-
alphabet inputs. Specifically, concerning the vulnerabilities
that result from multiple hops of the intended SM messages in
the ad-hoc networks, we investigated the scenarios where Eve
distributed multi-antenna frontends to monitor all legitimate
nodes’ transmitting and exploited receive diversity techniques,
namely MRC and MGS, in their detection of multiple SM
signal copies received from the legitimate link. In other words,
Eve’s maximised wiretapping capability was investigated in
this work. Our theoretical analysis and numerical results of
ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability substan-
tiated the benefits of our physical-layer secret key in terms
of improving the PLS for multi-hop MIMO wiretap ad-hoc
networks. Moreover, this information source controlled PLS
solution achieved better security, when MRC is adopted by
Eve, rather than MGS. Furthermore, this solution could lead
to a plainer transmission medium and provide more freedom
for the ad-hoc and IoT network design.
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